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COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, 
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, AND 
CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE 
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Benjamin Manchak* 
Abstract: This Comment examines the legality of the comprehensive uni-
lateral embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba within the frame-
work of international law. It argues that, independent of its humanitarian 
impact or the dubious legality of its extra-jurisdictional components, the 
comprehensive embargo violates international law because it undermines 
Cuba’s right to development. International law is, and has always been, a 
component part of U.S. law—it is enforceable in U.S. courts, it informs 
judicial interpretation of U.S. statutes, and it guides legislative and exec-
utive action in matters of both foreign and domestic policy. In addition to 
its supplementary interpretive function in our legal system, international 
law is, through the Supremacy Clause, binding on the United States as a 
constitutional matter. Because of the role international law plays in the 
United States, a direct conflict between federal and international law is 
constitutional anathema. This Comment argues that the tension must be 
resolved by reference to the substance and timing of the federal enact-
ments that violate international law. Thus, of the coordinate branches, the 
legislative branch is in the best position to correct the constitutional im-
balance. The Comment concludes that Congress must either pass new 
legislation explicitly renouncing the right to development as an inter-
national legal norm, or, in light of the role of international law in our con-
stitutional system, execute faithfully its duty to interpret and uphold the 
Constitution by repealing the legislation that has created the decades-old 
embargo. 
Introduction 
 Since the 1990s and the experience with the 661 regime in Iraq, a 
profusion of scholarship and political discourse has decried the use of 
comprehensive unilateral and multilateral trade sanctions because of 
the crippling effects such measures have on a target country’s popula-
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tion.1 Consequently, these all-encompassing, blanket sanctions have 
been almost universally rejected as the economic weapon of choice in 
international affairs.2 Both as a member of the U.N. Security Council 
and in its sovereign capacity, the United States has tacitly recognized the 
potential violations of international law occasioned by blanket meas-
ures.3 Even with respect to Cuba, a country on which it has maintained a 
comprehensive embargo despite widespread international opposition, 
the United States has made “humanitarian” exceptions to its embargo.4 
 Yet the United States’s efforts to bring its embargo on Cuba more 
in line with international human rights and international humanitarian 
legal norms have missed a critical point: the illegality of the embargo 
under international law is not predicated exclusively, or even primarily, 
on its humanitarian impact.5 This Comment argues that the compre-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions 32– 
38 (2010); see also David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanc-
tions: Lessons from the 1990s, in Targeting Economic Statecraft 1, 1 (David Cortright & 
George A. Lopez eds., 2002) (affirming that the catastrophic impact of the 661 sanctions 
in Iraq “cast a long shadow” and prompted a rethinking of the comprehensive sanctions 
paradigm). The 661 regime was the system of trade sanctions imposed on Iraq by U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 661. See S.C. Res. 661, ¶¶ 3–6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 
1990). Invoking the specter of “dual-use,” the United States and Great Britain were effec-
tively able to block nearly every type of good required in a modern industrial society from 
entering Iraq. See Gordon, supra, at 61–85. This stunning unilateralism resulted in a major 
humanitarian disaster and the devolution of Iraq from a first-world country to a pre-
industrial state. See id. 
2 See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that more targeted “smart” sanc-
tions have largely replaced their more expansive precursors, with both the United Nations 
and the European Union employing, exclusively, selective sanctions since the mid-1990s). 
3 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg. at 19–20, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.27 
(Oct. 28, 2009); U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg. at 14–15, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.33 
(Oct. 29, 2008); U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. A/62/PV.38 
(Oct. 30, 2007); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.50 (Nov. 
8, 2006). 
4 See Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7202 
(2006). Specifically, the President may not unilaterally restrict the flow of food or medicine 
into a sanctioned country. Id. As a result of the humanitarian exceptions, the United States 
is now Cuba’s largest supplier of food; the American people are its most significant hu-
manitarian contributor. See U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 14–15. 
But see Amnesty Int’l, The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and 
Social Rights 15 (2009) (clarifying that, while the easing of restrictions on agricultural 
exports has mitigated the severity of food shortages in Cuba, the export of medicines and 
medical equipment remains “severely limited” in practice). 
5 See U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 2, 3, 7, 9–11, 13, 15, 18, 
20, 23, 25. In denouncing the U.S. embargo of Cuba, a majority of the nations presenting 
at the General Assembly, including Egypt, Guyana (speaking on behalf of the fourteen 
member states of the Caribbean Community), Vietnam, China, Algeria, India, Angola, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Cuba, France, Laos, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Belarus, referred to 
the U.S. embargo’s effects on Cuba’s right to development as a reason for its illegitimacy 
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hensive embargo on Cuba could have no negative “humanitarian” con-
sequences whatsoever, and yet it would violate international law be-
cause it undermines a nation’s ability to develop.6 
 Because the federal laws and regulations codifying the Cuban em-
bargo conflict directly with U.S. treaty obligations and its duties under 
customary international law, they are unconstitutional.7 Until Congress 
                                                                                                                      
under international law. See id. Yet, the delegation from the United States completely ig-
nored the issue of development and focused only on humanitarian questions raised by the 
other countries. See id. at 14–15. 
6 See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 
at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200[B] (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200[A] (XXI), at 49, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); 
Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, at 186, U.N. GAOR, 41st 
Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986). Although the 
right to development certainly implicates other fundamental rights of peoples codified in 
such instruments as the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, those documents, along with the Declaration on the 
Right to Development, treat the right as a conceptually—and practically—discrete right 
protected under international law. See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, supra, arts. 22, 28; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
supra, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra, arts. 
1, 2(1); Declaration on the Right to Development, supra, art. 6. This Comment thus treats 
the right to the basic necessities of life such as food, potable water, and shelter as concep-
tually distinct from the right of a nation to develop beyond the capacity only to provide its 
population with the essentials. See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56; Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, supra, arts. 22, 28; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, 
art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra, arts. 1, 2(1); 
Declaration on the Right to Development, supra, art. 8. In this manner, the Comment 
categorically rejects any argument that the embargo on Cuba is legal under international 
law because it has not had a cataclysmic humanitarian impact based on such measures as 
life expectancy or infant mortality. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 16 (citing a 1997 
report by the American Association for World Health, which concluded that a major hu-
manitarian disaster resulting from the trade embargo, such as the one experienced in Iraq 
under the 661 regime, has been averted in Cuba only because of the Cuban government’s 
heavy investment in public health). 
7 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 877 (1987). Just as contradictions be-
tween co-equal federal enactments must be resolved under the Constitution, so too must 
discrepancies between customary international law and federal legislation. See id. Although 
the Supreme Court has never ruled on the point, there is nothing in the text of the Consti-
tution that would preclude the United States from elevating customary international law 
over regular federal enactments and giving effect to international customary legal norms 
even in the face of a later congressional enactment. See id. Even under a more conservative 
understanding, a direct conflict between customary international law and a federal enact-
ment is not simply an issue of domestic law versus international commitments—it is a con-
stitutional question. See id. at 877–78. As Professor Henkin explains, 
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promulgates new laws that explicitly assert this country’s intentions to 
contravene international law, the courts should strike down any provi-
sion of the embargo on Cuba, which affects Cuba’s right to develop, as 
unconstitutional.8 Alternatively, Congress should more seriously ap-
proach its duty to uphold the Constitution, rather than simply relying 
on the judiciary, by admitting the unconstitutionality of its own enact-
ments and duly repealing the various laws comprising the Cuban em-
bargo.9 President Barack Obama had an opportunity to demonstrate a 
renewed commitment to complying with the “law of nations” in Sep-
tember 2009, but he instead chose to stay the course of his predeces-
sors, dating back to Jimmy Carter, and extended the executive’s power 
to implement the embargo.10 For now, with no meaningful action be-
                                                                                                                      
Like treaties, customary law has now been declared to be United States law 
within the meaning of both article III and the supremacy clause. If an act of 
Congress can modify customary law for domestic purposes, it is not because 
customary law is like federal common law but rather because, like treaties, 
customary law is equal in status to legislation, and the more recent of the two 
governs. 
See id. at 878 (citation omitted). 
8 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act 
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”). It is an accepted jurisprudential principle that the executive 
and legislative branches may contravene international law, whether codified in treaties to 
which the United States is a party or existing in customary international law, especially 
where the branches act in concert (for example, where Congress “approves of a presiden-
tial act violative of customary international law”). See Michael J. Glennon, Raising the 
Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 
80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 321, 325 (1985). There are two critical limitations to the ability to violate 
international law, however, one being substantive and the other temporal. See Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 119. Substantively, an act of Congress or the President must 
contain a statement, “plainly expressed,” that the action is intended to repeal a norm of 
customary international law. See id. Temporally, the presidential or congressional action 
must come after the signing of a treaty or the development of an international legal norm. 
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Henkin, supra note 7, at 878. 
9 See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial 
Doctrine, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57, 62, 63 (1986) (“[B]oth the structure and text of the Constitu-
tion require Congress to determine the constitutionality of proposed enactments. . . . 
[N]othing in Marbury implies that only the courts can interpret the Constitution.”). 
10 See Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, Determination No. 2009–27, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,431, 47,431 (Sept. 16, 2009); 
Determination Extending the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,449, 40,449 (Sept. 12, 1978). On September 11, 2009, three 
days before the executive’s powers to impose the Cuban embargo (under the Trading with 
the Enemy Act (TWEA)) were set to lapse, President Obama issued a memorandum to the 
Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury stating, “I hereby determine that the con-
tinuation for 1 year of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba is in the na-
tional interest of the United States.” See Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authori-
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ing taken by the executive and little likelihood of intervention in this 
contentious political issue by the judiciary, it is up to Congress to “be 
cognizant of this country’s global leadership position and the need for 
it to set an example with respect to human rights obligations.”11 
 This Comment will examine the unilateral trade embargo imposed 
on Cuba by the United States in light of the role of international law in 
our constitutional system. Part I provides a brief overview of the em-
bargo itself, as it exists in U.S. domestic law. Part II traces the evolution 
of the right to development as an international legal norm, highlight-
ing its codification in treaty and crystallization as a norm of customary 
international law. Part III chronicles some of the devastating effects 
wrought by the all-encompassing nature of the embargo. Specifically, it 
focuses on the two areas in which international law and international 
legal norms are implicated: humanitarian consequences and develop-
ment effects. After situating international law properly within the dis-
cussion of U.S. constitutionalism, Part IV demonstrates why the U.S. 
blockade of Cuba, which conflicts directly with Cuba’s right to devel-
opment, is unconstitutional in its present form. Finally, Part V provides 
several options for “re-constitutionalizing” the blockade. It advocates 
for outright repeal of the legislative enactments codifying the embargo. 
Though not the only option, this is both the most expedient solution to 
the constitutional questions posed by the Cuban embargo and the only 
practical way to promote future compliance with international law. 
I. The Cuban Blockade: A Brief Account of U.S. Domestic Law 
 The legislation and regulations codifying the U.S. embargo of Cuba 
are paradigmatic of the type of comprehensive unilateral sanctions de-
cried by the international community.12 Originally imposed through the 
                                                                                                                      
ties Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,431. This was the thirty-
second time a president continued his powers under the TWEA with respect to Cuba. See 
infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
11 See Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
12 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 20 (“[The unilat-
eral Cuban embargo] is a flagrant violation of the provisions of the United Nations Char-
ter, the principles of international law and resolutions adopted year after year by this As-
sembly . . . .”); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Unilateral Economic 
Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries, at 6, Deliv-
ered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/64/179 ( July 27, 2009) (stating that unilateral 
sanctions used as instruments of political and economic coercion against developing coun-
tries “are contrary to the principles of international law, the sovereign equality of States, 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among States”); 
U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 7 (“The United States’ unilateral 
economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba represents a violation of in-
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powers granted to the president by the Trading with the Enemy Act 
(TWEA), the embargo has become increasingly more complex in na-
ture and panoptic in breadth with each successive law and regulation.13 
                                                                                                                      
ternational law, including international laws relating to the freedom of trade and naviga-
tion and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.”). 
13 See Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2006) 
(granting the President broad authority to control transactions with designated “enemies,” 
including the ability to investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, 
transfers of credit, payments that involve any banking institution over which the United 
States has jurisdiction, and the importation or exportation of currency, securities, or pre-
cious commodities as well as the ability to wield near absolute control over the property 
interests, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign country or foreign 
national covered under the Act); see also Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2370(a)(1) (2006) (excepting Cuba from the provision of any U.S. foreign assistance and 
granting additional authority to the President to maintain a total embargo on Cuba); Cu-
ban Democracy (Torricelli) Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6010 (extending the embargo 
to prohibit entry into U.S. ports of ships that have docked in Cuba and allowing the Presi-
dent to impose sanctions on other countries if they do business with Cuba); Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) (Helms-Burton) Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091 (ex-
tending further the jurisdictional reach of the embargo to include any person or govern-
ment doing business with a Cuban enterprise, which either existed prior to January 1, 1959 
or is a successor to a business in existence before that date); 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2009) (pro-
hibiting an expansive range of economic transactions and providing, generally, for the 
prohibition of most imports and exports vis-à-vis Cuba). The TWEA is the linchpin in U.S. 
foreign policy toward Cuba; the congressional delegation of authority to the executive 
under the TWEA comprises the bulk of the President’s authority to carry out the Cuban 
embargo. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (providing additional 
authority). This extraordinary grant of authority, most accurately understood as a wartime 
power, remains vested in the President despite the fact the United States has never en-
gaged in direct hostilities with Cuba. See generally Jennifer K. Elsea & Richard F. Grim-
mett, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: 
Historical Background and Legal Implications (2007), available at http://www.fas. 
org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf (detailing the history of U.S. armed conflicts, including 
conflicts not explicitly authorized by Congress). In 1977, Congress amended the TWEA, 
curtailing the President’s power to exert control over both domestic and international 
economic transactions under the auspices of the Act’s national emergencies provision. 
Robert L. Pacholski, Regulation Prohibiting Transactions Incident to Travel to, from, or Within 
Cuba Held Constitutional, 17 Tex. Int’l L.J. 529, 532–33 (1982). The new law contained a 
grandfather clause, however, permitting the President to extend, each year for an addi-
tional year, the exercise of all TWEA powers relating to national emergencies declared 
prior to 1977, provided the President believed the extension to be in the “national interest 
of the United States.” Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 
1625 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C. app.). In 1978, President Jimmy 
Carter was the first President to extend executive powers under the TWEA with respect to 
the Cuban embargo; in September 2009, President Barack Obama became the latest 
President in an uninterrupted line to do the same. See Determination No. 2009–27, Con-
tinuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 74 
Fed. Reg. 47,431, 47,431 (Sept. 16, 2009); Determination Extending the Exercise of the 
Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 
40,449, 40,449 (Sept. 12, 1978). Peculiarly, the executive’s powers under the TWEA exer-
cised with respect to North Korea, a country that has tested nuclear weapons and intercon-
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In its current form, the blockade generally prohibits the export and im-
port of goods and services with Cuba or Cuban entities around the 
world.14 The embargo also covers an exceedingly broad range of eco-
nomic transactions between the United States and Cuba, including 
transfers of credit, payments, foreign exchange transactions, securities 
                                                                                                                      
tinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching sovereign U.S. soil, were voluntarily termi-
nated in 2008. See Termination of the Exercise of Authorities Under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act with Respect to North Korea, Proclamation No. 8271, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,785, 
36,785 ( June 27, 2008); see also Making a Splash, Economist, Apr. 11, 2009, at 22–23 (de-
scribing the threat the government of North Korea continues to pose both to its neighbors 
and to nations further afield such as the United States). Cuba is now the only country 
upon which the executive is authorized to impose a comprehensive embargo pursuant to 
the powers under the TWEA. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 8 n.15. 
Additionally, Cuba was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1982 pursuant to the 
authority granted to the Secretary of State to make such determinations by the Foreign 
Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export Administration Act. See 22 
U.S.C. § 2371(a); Arms Export Control Act of 1968, 22 U.S.C. § 2870(d); Export Admini-
stration Act (EAA) of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j); U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of 
Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). Viewing the 
provisions of these three laws together, the principal additions to the embargo occasioned 
by the designation as a sponsor of terrorism are “restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a 
ban on the sale and exportation of defense-related goods, controls placed upon dual-use 
goods, and restrictions upon financial transactions.” Lucien J. Dhooge, Condemning Khar-
toum: The Illinois Divestment Act and Foreign Relations, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 245, 261 n.104 (2006). 
14 See 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2009); 15 C.F.R. § 746.1; Terence J. Lau, Triggering Parent Com-
pany Liability Under United States Sanctions Regimes: The Troubling Implications of Prohibiting 
Approval and Facilitation, 41 Am. Bus. L.J. 413, 424 (2004). Certainly, its inability to sell to 
the U.S. market is economically harmful to Cuba, but the economic damage wrought by 
the regulation of imports from Cuba is considerably less significant, in terms of the coun-
try’s development prospects, than that caused by export controls on U.S. goods. See The 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Necessity of Ending the Economic, Com-
mercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba, at 83, Deliv-
ered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/93 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter The Secretary-
General, 2008]. The United States is the closest and most diversified market, yet the em-
bargo prohibits Cuba and Cuban companies from obtaining any goods, services, or tech-
nologies produced in the United States, covered under U.S. patents, or containing any 
components of U.S. origin. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Neces-
sity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of 
America Against Cuba, at 93, Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/64/97 ( June 23, 
2009) [hereinafter The Secretary-General, 2009]. Swept into these categories are a scopic 
range of “development inputs such as medicines, medical equipment, fertilizers, food sup-
plements, laboratory equipment, agricultural implements, computers, office supplies, 
vehicles, tools, construction materials, electric generators and other basic equipment.” Id. 
Given that the United States is such a dominant force in such areas as technology, with 
certain technologies exclusively controlled by U.S.-based companies, it is nearly impossible 
for Cuba to take advantage of many technological advancements currently driving eco-
nomic growth and development in other countries. See The Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Im-
posed by the United States of America Against Cuba, at 81, Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/62/92 (Aug. 3, 2007) [hereinafter The Secretary-General, 2007]. 
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transactions, and property transfers.15 Indeed, the types of economic 
transactions prohibited by the embargo encapsulate virtually every form 
of economic exchange in modern commerce.16 As though its unilateral 
embargo were insufficiently comprehensive, the United States has ap-
plied direct sanctions and coercive economic pressure on other state 
and business entities in order to discourage other trade relationships 
with Cuba.17 Thus, by exercising what many commentators would con-
sider illegal extraterritorial jurisdiction, the United States has effectively 
transformed its blockade of Cuba into a de facto multilateral endeavor.18 
II. The Right to Development in International Law 
 The right to development is an inalienable human right intrinsi-
cally linked to a peoples’ sovereignty.19 A state’s right to development 
occupies an exalted position in international law; it is protected in sev-
eral of international law’s foundational documents including the U.N. 
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.20 In addition to the legiti-
                                                                                                                      
15 See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201. 
16 See id. pt. 515. 
17 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (allowing the President to pressure other countries to 
restrict credit relations with Cuba, thereby making it more difficult for Cuba to obtain 
substantial quantities of goods on a non-cash basis); id. § 6003(b) (allowing the President 
to impose sanctions on countries that trade with Cuba); id. § 6005(b) (creating an un-
precedented six month trade “purgatory” for any ship that docks in a Cuban port); id. 
§ 6082(a)(1)(A) (expanding the United States’s jurisdictional reach to any “person . . . 
[who] traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after 
January 1, 1959”); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(6) (allowing the President to curtail diplo-
matic relations with any country exporting goods or technology to Cuba); 31 C.F.R. 
§ 515.201 (prohibiting payments and transfers of credit through any banking institution 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States). 
18 See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 905, 
907 (2009) (noting the weight of authority considering “secondary” economic sanctions to 
be illegal under customary international law). 
19 See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 6, art. 1. 
20 See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6, 
art. 28; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 1; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, art. 1. These foun-
dational documents—often collectively referred to as the International Bill of Human 
Rights—are more closely associated with the first and second “generations” of interna-
tional human rights norms, that is, civil and political rights and economic, social, and cul-
tural rights, respectively. See Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and 
Politics of the Right to Development, 15 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 473, 482–83 (1985); Stephen Marks, 
The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 137, 138 
(2004). Under this rubric, the right to development would belong to a third generation of 
“solidarity rights belonging to peoples and covering global concerns like development, 
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macy as a principle of international law, which it derives from its inclu-
sion in the International Bill of Human Rights, the right to develop-
ment has been further entrenched as an international legal norm by 
later, more specific treaties and resolutions.21 By the early 1970s, the 
                                                                                                                      
environment, humanitarian assistance, peace, communication, and common heritage.” 
Marks, supra, at 138. Some scholars have therefore argued that the right to development, 
which is not explicitly mentioned in the International Bill of Human Rights, is not even 
implicated by the foundational human rights law documents. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra, at 
482–89 (“If a right to development were enshrined in these documents, as is often 
claimed, it would indeed be firmly established as a human right in international law. In 
fact, however, it is not.”). Such views, however, tend to obfuscate substance of international 
human rights law and over-simplify the process by which international human rights 
norms develop. See Marks, supra, at 138. Granted, the International Bill of Human Rights 
does not explicitly define a human right to development as such, but it provides both the 
conceptual framework for envisioning a fundamental right to development and the sub-
stantive underpinnings of the right. See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 28; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
supra note 6, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra 
note 6, art. 1; see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the International 
Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human Right in Relation with Other Human Rights 
Based on International Co-operation, Including the Right to Peace, Taking into Account the Require-
ments of the New International Economic Order and the Fundamental Human Needs, ¶¶ 57–63, 
Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 ( Jan. 2, 1979) (enumerating the 
relevant provisions in the various foundational instruments implying and indeed defining 
the right to development, concluding that “the legal norms relevant to the right to devel-
opment are to be found primarily in the Charter of the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights”). 
21 See, e.g., Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 6, arts. 1–10; Declara-
tion on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542 (XXIV), at 49, U.N. GAOR, 24th 
Sess., 1829th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (Dec. 11, 1969); Implementation 
of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2543 (XXIV), at 53, 
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 1829th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (Dec. 11, 1969); 
see also Marks, supra note 20, at 138. By operation of treaty, not only are states obligated to 
refrain from impeding the development of other states, but member states of the United 
Nations also bear the responsibility of “develop[ing] friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for . . . self-determination of peoples” and actively “promot[ing] condi-
tions of economic social progress and development.” See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55 (emphasis 
added). These affirmative duties were reiterated and more clearly defined in later instru-
ments such as the Declaration on the Right to Development. See Declaration on the Right 
to Development, supra note 6, art. 3. In this Declaration, signatory states further commit-
ted themselves to act in accord with the U.N. Charter and to create “national and interna-
tional conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development,” and “promote 
a new international economic order based on sovereign equality.” See id. Included among 
the objectives of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development are “[t]he creation 
of conditions for rapid and sustained social and economic development, particularly in the 
developing countries,” as well as “[e]quitable sharing of scientific and technological ad-
vances by developed and developing countries.” Declaration on Social Progress and Devel-
opment, supra, arts. 12, 13. The responsibility for achieving these goals is placed primarily 
upon each individual nation state. See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra 
note 6, pmbl.; Declaration on Social Progress and Development, supra, arts. 14–22. The 
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right to development was undergoing a more formal, comprehensive 
articulation in the specific language of human rights.22 Over the course 
of the next fourteen years, the right to development was proclaimed in 
various texts, including regional multilateral instruments.23 In 1986, the 
overwhelming majority of nations, acting through the U.N. General As-
sembly, built upon the foundation laid in the International Bill of Hu-
man Rights and certified the right to development as a human right.24 
Since the passage of the Declaration on the Right to Development, the 
right has become a fixture in the pantheon of internationally-
recognized human rights, regularly appearing in such texts as multilat-
eral treaties, declarations of international conferences and summits, an-
nual resolutions of the General Assembly, reports of the Secretary Gen-
eral, and annual reports of the Human Rights Council.25 
                                                                                                                      
international community—particularly the more economically and technically advanced 
countries—are nevertheless expected to provide “technical, financial, and material assis-
tance” to help developing countries achieve “the social objectives of national development 
plans” as well as “benefit fully from their national resources.” See Declaration on Social 
Progress and Development, supra, art. 23. 
22 See Marks, supra note 20, at 138. The first President of the Senegal Supreme Court, 
Keba M’Baye, is generally credited with precipitating what would become a robust dis-
course on the right to development in the language of human rights in his Inaugural Ad-
dress of the Third Teaching Session of the International Institute of Human Rights (a the 
René Cassin Foundation) in 1972. See Héctor Gros Espiell, The Right of Development as a 
Human Right, 16 Tex. Int’l L.J. 189, 192 (1981); Marks, supra note 20, at 138 n.5. 
23 See, e.g., Organization of African Unity, African [Banjul] Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights, arts. 20, 22, 24, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; Declaration on the Use 
of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of 
Mankind, G.A. Res. 3384 (XXX), at 86, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2400th plen. mtg., Supp. 
No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/Res./3384 (Nov. 10, 1975). 
24 See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 6. Of the 159 voting mem-
bers in the General Assembly at the time, 146 countries voted in favor of the Declaration 
on the Right to Development, 8 abstained, and 4 did not vote. Rapporteur, Report of the 
Third Committee on Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System 
for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ¶ 8, Delivered 
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (Dec. 1, 1986). The United States cast the sole 
negative vote. Id. 
25 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 63/178, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/178 (Mar. 26, 2009) (“[T]he 
right to development is an inalienable human right . . . .”); Human Rights Council, Annual 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the 
High Commissioner and Secretary-General, ¶ 35, Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/13/26 (Dec. 18, 2009) (“The effective realization of the right to development is 
one of the OHCHR priorities.”); World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 ( July 12, 
1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] (“The World Conference on Human Rights reaf-
firms the right to development . . . as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part 
of fundamental human rights.”); see also Marks, supra note 20, at 139 (noting the ubiquity 
of references to the right to development in international texts). 
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 Because of its ubiquity and broad-based acceptance by the interna-
tional community, the right to development has undoubtedly risen to 
the level of customary international law.26 The development of norms of 
customary international law is a fluid, evolutionary process, which is as-
certained by reference to the general practice of states rooted in a sense 
of legal obligation over a period of time.27 The right to development is 
clearly traceable in this manner.28 It has been over sixty years since the 
foundations of the right were laid in the U.N. Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and over forty years since they were 
strengthened in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, annexed to U.N. Charter. Ar-
ticle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the 
United Nations created along with that body in 1945, is the traditional starting point when 
examining the sources of international law; indeed it is considered the “constitution” of 
the international community. Henry J. Steiner et al., Comment on International Dimension of 
Human Rights Movement, in Henry J. Steiner et al., International Human Rights in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals 58, 60 (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). It lists 
the following sources of international law: 
  a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
  b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
  c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
  d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38; see also Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 102(2), (3), rep. n.2 (1987) (noting that general 
acceptance of states and the “general and consistent practice of states,” which takes many 
forms including “resolutions, declarations, and other statements of principles” by the U.N. 
General Assembly, form the basis for customary international law); Marks, supra note 20, at 
138–42, 167 (discussing the recognition of the right to development by a majority of gov-
ernments in the world, but conceding some of the practical difficulties associated with the 
right). 
27 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38; Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 102(2) (1987)(“Customary international law re-
sults from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”). Evidence of international law may be gleaned from various authorities, 
though it is clear that resolutions of universal international organizations such as the U.N. 
General Assembly are to be accorded substantial weight if the majority of states vote in fa-
vor. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 103 cmt. c 
(1987). Moreover, the requirement that a norm be recognized in international law for 
some de minimis period has been significantly limited, if not altogether abandoned, since 
World War II. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 102 
rep. n.2 (1987). 
28 See Marks, supra note 20, at 358. 
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and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.29 It has 
been thirty-eight years since the right was proposed using the specific 
language of human rights, twenty-four years since the international 
community recognized the right in a formal, broad-based multinational 
instrument, and seventeen years since a consensus involving all govern-
ments was reached on the right to development.30 The right is consis-
tently invoked by states as a rule of international law.31 Indeed, the right 
is so fundamental, so inviolable, and so broadly accepted, it may even be 
properly considered a jus cogens norm.32 States are therefore bound 
both by treaty and customary international law to respect the funda-
mental right of other nations to pursue economic and social develop-
ment in accordance with their own sovereign volition.33 
                                                                                                                      
29 See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6, 
art. 28; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 1; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, art. 1. 
30 See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 6, arts. 1–10; Vienna Decla-
ration, supra note 25; supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Marks, supra note 20, at 
139–40, 151 (observing that even the United States has joined a consensus on the right to 
development, specifically at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna). 
31 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Moreover, and in accord with section 103 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., the invocation of the right to devel-
opment by states regularly goes unchallenged. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. 
mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 14–15; 
U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th 
plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. The United States often objects to the manner in which the 
Cuban embargo is framed by the government of Cuba and other states, but, at least in the 
context of the annual vote on the necessity of ending the Cuban embargo, it has not yet 
lodged an objection to the widespread assertion that its blockade violates Cuba’s right to 
development. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. 
GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 14–15; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. 
mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. 
32 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to Development, in International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects 1176, 1193 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991) (affirming 
that the right to development “should be regarded as belonging to jus cogens”). A jus cogens 
norm is a norm of international law considered so essential that no derogation from it is 
permitted. Id. at 1185. Although there is no precise, authoritative enumeration of these 
norms, the generally accepted list includes the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, torture, 
forced disappearance, and prolonged arbitrary detention. See Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 702 (1987); see also Bedjaoui, supra, at 1183 (argu-
ing that “[i]f the right to development does not . . . belong to jus cogens, it would have to be 
concluded . . . that genocide . . . is permitted by international law”). It is beyond the scope 
of this Comment to argue that the right to development has indeed passed into the realm 
of jus cogens; the fact that this conception of the right has been persuasively argued is only 
offered as additional support for the proposition that the right to development is, at the 
very least, a norm of customary international law. See Bedjaoui, supra, at 1183, 1193. 
33 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 102(1) (1987) 
(noting that international law becomes binding through international agreements as well 
as customary international law). 
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 Despite its near-universal acceptance as a legitimate norm of inter-
national human rights law, however, the United States remains hostile to 
the right to development.34 The United States generally votes against 
any specific resolutions codifying, promoting, or otherwise invoking the 
right to development.35 Relevant, too, is the fact that the United States 
has signed, but not ratified, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights.36 While it both signed and ratified the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it lodged a reserva-
tion declaring the agreement to be non-self-executing.37 
 In no way, however, does the inimical stance the United States has 
taken toward the right to development relieve it of its international ob-
ligations with respect to that right.38 First, customary international law 
dictates that, even in the absence of ratification, a state’s signature on a 
treaty obligates it to refrain from activities that might defeat the object 
and purpose of that instrument.39 Additionally, an assertion that a 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Marks, supra note 20, at 142. 
35 See id. Perhaps the most significant example of U.S. opposition to the right to devel-
opment came in 1986, when it entered the only vote against the Declaration of the Right 
to Development. See Rapporteur, supra note 24, ¶ 8. 
36 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6; 
United Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection: [Status of] Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
with the Secretary-General, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (follow 
“Chapter IV: Human Rights” hyperlink; then follow “3: International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York, 16 December 1966” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 
20, 2010). 
37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6; United Nations, 
supra note 36. The U.S. Senate’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights was subject to a number of reservations, including “[t]hat the United 
States declares that the provisions of articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-
executing.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6; 138 Cong. 
Rec. 8068, 8071 (1992). A declaration that the treaty is non-self-executing is an assertion 
that the rights guaranteed under the treaty are not enforceable in U.S. courts absent ena-
bling legislation. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of 
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 341, 346–47 (1995). When employed by the United States, 
a declaration of non-self-execution is “designed to keep its own judges from judging the 
human rights in the United States by international standards.” Louis Henkin, supra, at 346; 
see United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979). 
38 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
of the U.S. § 324 cmt. e (1987); Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International 
Law: The Distinction Between Treaty and Customary Law, 28 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 973, 991–
92 (1995); Henkin, supra note 7, at 877–78. 
39 See Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 18; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, U.S. Disre-
gard for International Law in the World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians—A Case Study, 
40 B.C. L. Rev. 275, 314 n.204 (1998) (noting that the United States has not ratified the 
Vienna Convention, but that the rule stated in Article 18 is “widely-recognized” as a prin-
ciple of customary international law). Because it has signed the International Covenant on 
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treaty is not binding, either because a state lodged a declaration of non-
self-execution or because the state did not sign and ratify it, is irrelevant 
when the norm in question is one of customary international law.40 Re-
gardless of a state’s posture vis-à-vis a treaty (for example, as a non-
signatory or a party subject to reservations), if that treaty also embodies 
customary international law, the state is bound.41 The United States, 
therefore, is not exempt from its dual responsibilities under treaty and 
customary international law regarding the right to development.42 
III. Effects of the Embargo 
 According to the Cuban government, the United States’s unilat-
eral embargo of the island nation has resulted in over ninety-six billion 
dollars in aggregate economic losses since it was imposed nearly fifty 
years ago.43 Although the damage wrought on Cuba and its people by 
the trade embargo can be quantified in monetary terms, this figure 
does not adequately capture the full cost to the nation of Cuba and its 
people.44 The devastation can be measured by the health of the Cuban 
                                                                                                                      
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United States cannot undermine the object and 
purpose of that document, which includes protecting the right of peoples “freely [to] pur-
sue their economic, social and cultural development.” See Vienna Convention, supra note 
38, art. 18; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, 
art. 1. 
40 See Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 38 (“Nothing [in the present Convention 
related to a treaty’s effect on third parties] precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from be-
coming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as 
such.”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 324 cmt. e 
(1987) (“This section does not preclude the possibility that an agreement among a large 
number of parties may give rise to a customary rule of international law binding on non-
party states.”); Chodosh, supra note 38, at 991 (noting that treaties are binding once rati-
fied and conceding that “congressional consent [is arguably not] a prerequisite for cus-
tomary international law to become binding in the U.S. courts”); Henkin, supra note 7, at 
877 (“The law of nations, including both treaties and customary international law, is bind-
ing on the United States.”). Because treaties can become binding on states through the 
operation of customary international law, declarations that a treaty is non-self-executing 
are not only nugatory, they are also “against the spirit of the Constitution . . . [and] may be 
unconstitutional.” See Henkin, supra note 37, at 346. 
41 See Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 38; Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the U.S. § 324 cmt. e (1987); Chodosh, supra note 38, at 991–92; Hen-
kin, supra note 7, at 877. 
42 See Vienna Convention, supra note 38, art. 38; Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the U.S. § 324 cmt. e (1987); Chodosh, supra note 38, at 991–92; Hen-
kin, supra note 7, at 877. 
43 The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 23. 
44 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Necessity of Ending the 
Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against 
Cuba, at 17, Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/132 (Aug. 8, 2006). 
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people, the state of Cuban infrastructure, and most importantly for the 
purposes of this Comment, the level of economic development attained 
versus the country’s potential for growth.45 
A. Humanitarian Consequences 
 The destructive impact of comprehensive multilateral trade sanc-
tions, and unilateral sanctions made equally expansive through super-
jurisdictional measures, on the humanitarian situation in target states is 
well-documented.46 Especially in the last two decades, there has been a 
growing chorus of disapproval among human rights organizations, 
scholars, and politicians to end the use of these “blunt instruments” as 
tools for effecting behavior modification or regime change in target 
states.47 In response, sanctioning states have adopted a number of pol-
icy initiatives, including the use of so-called “smart” sanctions, to mini-
                                                                                                                      
45 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 24–37; The Secretary-General, 
2007, supra note 14, at 19–37. The Secretary-General has issued similar reports on an an-
nual basis for nearly two decades, since the Cuban government first requested that the 
General Assembly initiate a yearly vote to end the U.S. blockade of Cuba. See Letter from 
the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations to the Secretary-General, 
U.N. Doc. A/46/193 (Aug. 16, 1991). 
46 See generally Gordon, supra note 1 (examining the problems caused by economic 
sanctions specifically in the context of the 661 Regime); Political Gain and Civilian 
Pain: The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Thomas G. Weiss et. al. eds., 
1997) (reviewing the humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions generally and in spe-
cific settings); Brian Frederking, The United States and the Security Council: Col-
lective Security Since the Cold War 61–77 (2007) (providing examples of the Security 
Council’s economic sanctions in the post-cold war era and explaining that sanctions that 
are “too ‘tough’ are counterproductive”); Joy Gordon, A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The 
Ethics of Economic Sanctions, 13 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 123 (1999) (examining the “ethical 
complexities” and problems of economic sanctions); Drew Christiansen & Gerard F. Pow-
ers, Unintended Consequences, 49 Bull. Atomic Scientists, Nov. 1993, 41(discussing John 
Foster Dulles’s view after World War I that economic sanctions “tend to harm the inno-
cent” and that sanctions should be imposed in way that avoid “undue hardships and ineq-
uities”); David Cortright & Samina Ahmed, Sanctions: Modify ’em, 54 Bull. Atomic Scien-
tists, Sept. 1998, 22 (“[I]n general trade sanctions inevitably cause the greatest harm to 
the most vulnerable.”); David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Economic Sanctions and Human 
Rights: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 1 Int’l J. Hum. Rts., Sept. 1997, 1, 1 
(1997). 
47 See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organi-
zation, ¶ 89, Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/52/1 (Sept. 3, 1997) (calling for 
“less blunt and more effective” sanctions through which the desired political objectives 
might be achieved with less pernicious humanitarian consequences); Gordon, supra note 
46, at 141 (“The more complete the sanctions, the more effective they will be, in terms of 
economic damage. . . . The greater the degree to which the economy is generally under-
mined, the greater the damage to the civilian population, outside the military and political 
leadership.”); Cortright & Ahmed, supra note 46, at 22 (“[S]anctions inevitably cause the 
greatest harm to the most vulnerable.”). 
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mize the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions on civilian popu-
lations.48 
 To date, however, the calamitous humanitarian impact of the 
comprehensive embargo on Cuba has not caused the United States to 
align its policy with the general international consensus condemning 
such sweeping measures, and the humanitarian situation in Cuba con-
tinues to deteriorate.49 What this means in terms of the legality of the 
embargo under international humanitarian law and international hu-
man rights law is beyond the scope of this discussion.50 The humanitar-
ian questions raised by the embargo comprise a critical part of the 
whole picture that emerges; to the extent these issues are not the focus 
of this discussion is only to spotlight the topic of development.51 
B. Impact on Development 
 The manner in which the embargo impacts the humanitarian 
situation in Cuba, and the nature of those effects, is linked with the 
concept of development.52 It is nevertheless possible to parse out the 
violations of international law related to the humanitarian conse-
quences of the embargo and the violations of international law related 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Cortright & Lopez, supra note 1, at 1, 6. The idea of smart sanctions emerged 
during the 1990s in response to the unmitigated, panoptic damage inflicted on target 
states by comprehensive sanctions regimes, which necessarily affected—often dispropor-
tionately so—innocent sectors of the population. See id. at 1. The concept of smart sanc-
tions is fairly broad and encompasses measures imposed on a state, which “target” the po-
litical establishment in ways that (attempt to) minimize the negative humanitarian impact 
on the general population. See id. at 11–15. In addition to shifting its coercive economic 
strategies toward the use of smart sanctions since the 1990s, the U.N. Security Council has 
attempted to mitigate the destructive humanitarian impact of trade sanctions by providing 
for humanitarian exemptions from comprehensive sanctions regimes, as well as requesting 
periodic appraisals of the overall impact of sanctions on the people of target nations. Jer-
emy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law 141 (2007). 
49 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 16–19. 
50 See discussion infra Part III.B. Not only is harming the civilian population of the 
sanctioned state ethically opprobrious, but it may also be illegal under international law. 
See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 13–21 (providing a clear, concise exposition of this 
position, which is gaining force in the international community). Although it deals specifi-
cally with Cuba, the Amnesty International article may be read to stand for the broader 
proposition that any sanctions regime or embargo, which has a substantial negative impact 
on the health of the target state’s populace, is per se illegal under international law. See id. 
51 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
52 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 19 (noting, for example, the difficulties in treat-
ing conditions such as HIV in the absence of a more highly developed infrastructure and 
without more advanced medical equipment). 
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to the impact of the embargo on Cuba’s national development.53 As-
suming, arguendo, that the United States could maintain its embargo 
with absolutely no ill humanitarian effects on the Cuban people (for ex-
ample, if the people had access to quality healthcare, food, and potable 
water), the blockade would still prevent the Cuban nation-state from 
transforming from a third-world service and agricultural society to a 
second or first-world information-based society.54 The Cuban people 
could therefore experience the same levels of such key health indica-
tors as life expectancy, child mortality, or immunization as they did be-
fore the embargo, yet the blockade would constitute a separate viola-
tion of international law by inhibiting the country from developing up 
to its potential.55 
 The comprehensive unilateral trade sanctions regime imposed by 
the United States on Cuba specifically targets those aspects of the Cu-
ban nation-state critical for national development.56 While the contours 
of the right to development are still being defined in international dis-
course, there is a consensus on at least a few “pillars of development,” 
including banking, telecommunications and technology, human re-
sources, and infrastructure.57 This list is certainly not all-inclusive, but it 
                                                                                                                      
53 See generally U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 7–11; The Secre-
tary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 30–37. 
54 See U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 7–11; The Secretary-
General, 2009, supra note 14, at 30–37. 
55 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 24–37; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 
4, at 16. Cuba’s significant investment in its public health system has forestalled a major 
humanitarian disaster. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 16. The country has managed to 
blunt the negative impact of the embargo on the health of its people, for example, by in-
creasing the per capita number of doctors (over twice as high as in the United States by 
2001) and pursuing innovative healthcare strategies. See Linda M. Whiteford & Laur-
ence G. Branch, Primary Health Care in Cuba 41 (2008). In contrast, Cuba’s ability to 
cope effectively with the blockade with respect to pursuing its economic development has 
been considerably more constrained. See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 
24–37. In this sense, the infringement on Cuba’s right to development, as a discrete breach 
of international law, may be even more serious than the violation related to the harm the 
embargo has wrought on the civilian population. See id. at 30–37. 
56 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 28, 31, 32–34, 41, 97, 112; The 
Secretary-General, 2007, supra note 14, at 19, 27, 29, 38–39, 75, 78, 92, 98–99, 102; U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 7–11. 
57 See Marks, supra note 20, at 141–42 (describing the range of opinions on what is en-
compassed in the right to development); see also U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Securing the 
Future: A Strategy for Economic Growth 5, 13–14 (2008), available at http://www.usaid. 
gov/our_work (follow “Economic Growth and Trade” hyperlink; then follow “Securing the 
Future: A Strategy for Economic Growth (April 2008)” hyperlink) (declaring that finance, 
infrastructure, and human resources are critical to enabling economic growth and avoiding 
distorted patterns of development); Senate Econ. Planning Office, Senate of the Phil., 
An Economic and Social Development Framework: Five Pillars of Growth 7–40 
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provides a basic framework, to which the United States government 
itself subscribes, for conceptualizing the form and process of develop-
ment.58 Because the U.S. embargo systematically undermines the integ-
rity of Cuba’s banking system and isolates it from the modern commer-
cial world, impedes technological advancement, frustrates its ability to 
cultivate human capital, and obstructs the proper functioning of its in-
frastructure, it directly violates Cuba’s right to development.59 
 By making it illegal for Cuba to trade in U.S. dollars and inhibiting 
its ability effectively to move money in the international banking system, 
the embargo precludes the country from accessing the capital necessary 
to develop.60 For example, under the embargo, any bank subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States (essentially any bank doing business in 
or with the United States) is forbidden from engaging in any transfer of 
credit or payment transaction with Cuba or a Cuban national.61 As a re-
sult of such far-reaching, extraterritorial measures, Cuba not only has 
extreme difficulty meeting its financial obligations, but its ability to 
maintain a normal, properly-functioning banking sector is also severely 
                                                                                                                      
(2004), available at http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/Five%20Pillars&20of%20Growth. 
pdf (including, in its discussion of the factors necessary for development, a stable banking 
system, higher technological capacities, an educated and healthy workforce, and an efficient 
infrastructure). 
58 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 57, at 5, 13–14; Senate Econ. Planning 
Office, supra note 57, at 7–40. It would be a hallow enterprise indeed to assert that states 
are entitled to development as a human right without concretely defining that right; yet 
there is no single, comprehensive, agreed upon schema for effecting development. See U.S. 
Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 57, at 3–18; Senate Econ. Planning Office, supra note 
57, at 7–40; Marks, supra note 20, at 141–42. Indeed, the United States remains so en-
trenched in its opposition to the right to development partly because of the all-
encompassing manner in which it has been envisioned by other countries, particularly 
developing nations. See Marks, supra note 20, at 143–52. Circumscribing the conceptual 
outlines of the right to development according to the views of United States, therefore, 
undercuts any argument that the right sweeps too broadly and allows for a practical ap-
praisal of the Cuban embargo vis-à-vis that framework. See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 
supra note 57, at 3–18; Marks, supra note 20, at 143–52. For a more in-depth discussion of 
economic development in theory and practice, see generally James M. Cypher & James L. 
Dietz, The Process of Economic Development (2d ed. 2004) (providing a comprehen-
sive overview of the concept of development in terms of history, theory, and practical ap-
plication). 
59 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 57, at 13–14; Senate Econ. Planning 
Office, supra note 57, at 7–40; The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 28, 31, 32–
34, 97, 112; The Secretary-General, 2007, supra note 14, at 27, 29, 38–39, 75, 78, 92, 98–99, 
102; discussion supra Part II. 
60 See Senate Econ. Planning Office, supra note 57, at 7. 
61 See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a)(1) (2009). 
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diminished.62 This has dire implications for Cuba’s development pros-
pects, as “[debt] and a weak financial and banking sector spoil [a] coun-
try’s macroeconomy and serve as major constraints to higher growth.”63 
 By barring access to technology, the embargo inhibits Cuba’s abil-
ity to engage in the type of higher-order economic activities so critical 
to growth and development in the information-based global econ-
omy.64 For example, the Cuban government and Cuban national com-
panies are prohibited from purchasing products, components, techni-
cal equipment, or technical inputs that are under United States 
patents.65 Cuba’s inability to import various technologies has harmed 
sectors of its economy ranging from the poultry and agricultural indus-
tries to the research science and biotechnology industries.66 The com-
munications sector has likewise been damaged, highlighting the chal-
lenges posed to economic and social development when 
communications technologies are restricted.67 
 By restraining the ability of Cuban students to access information 
and engage in scholarly discourse, Cuba’s ability to foster and fully util-
ize its human capital in the pursuit of economic growth is severely cur-
tailed.68 For example, Cuba’s students, ranging from primary school to 
the university level, cannot access a variety of internet databases, web 
                                                                                                                      
62 See id. § 515.201; The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 31; The Secretary-
General, 2007, supra note 14, at 38–39. 
63 See Senate Econ. Planning Office, supra note 57, at 7. 
64 See Manuel Castells, Flows, Networks, and Identities: A Critical Theory of the Informal Soci-
ety, in Globalization: Critical Concepts in Sociology 65, 72, 81 (Roland Robertson & 
Kathleen E. White eds., 2003) (declaring that a veritable “technology revolution” is un-
derway wherein “the ability to use . . . information technologies [is] a fundamental tool of 
development,” while the lack of such technological information capacity undermines a 
country’s ability to develop). 
65 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 25, 93; The Secretary-General, 
2007, supra note 14, at 81. The United States is the most competitive and most diversified 
market for various technologies. See The Secretary-General, 2007, supra note 14, at 81. If 
Cuba is unable to obtain goods such as computers, software, and laboratory equipment 
from the United States, it is often the case that Cuba is foreclosed from obtaining these 
items entirely because they are too expensive to import from distant markets, do not exist 
outside the U.S. market, or are otherwise unavailable in Cuba because of licensing restric-
tions. See id. at 32, 36, 65, 81, 99. 
66 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 28, 32–34; The Secretary-General, 
2007, supra note 14, at 27, 75, 78. 
67 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 34–36; The Secretary-General, 
2007, supra note 14, at 89. 
68 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 28–29; The Secretary-General, 
2007, supra note 14, at 29; see also Senate Econ. Planning Office, supra note 57, at 31 
(noting the importance of the education sector’s contribution to development, specifically, 
“better educated or trained worker[s]”). 
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pages, or scientific and technical journals and publications essential to 
the scholarly enterprise.69 Nor do academics “have access to up-to-date 
works from United States writers or research and education centres.”70 
Moreover, without high-bandwidth internet lines and open access to 
internet resources, Cuba’s library system cannot effectively deliver in-
formation to the Cuban people, and information exchanges with scien-
tific and academic networks in different countries is impeded.71 Despite 
its heavy investment in education, Cuba is at risk of experiencing a 
shortage of well-educated, well-trained workers—a deficiency that can 
undermine and distort patterns of growth.72 
 By constraining its ability to import materials and technical knowl-
edge, the embargo subverts the Cuban government’s efforts to create 
new infrastructure—a prerequisite to economic and industrial devel-
opment.73 A “stable supply of construction materials, tools and [techno-
logical] equipment” is necessary for infrastructural development; with-
out such a supply, Cuba encounters great difficulties constructing and 
maintaining even the most basic projects such as human settlements.74 
The generally poor state of the Cuban infrastructure also severely limits 
the country’s capacity to trade, process food, distribute water, and pro-
duce agricultural goods.75 A working infrastructure is “a key factor in a 
country’s economic development because it facilitates the movement of 
goods, services and people . . . [and] induce[s] economic activity.”76 
                                                                                                                      
69 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 28; The Secretary-General, 2007, 
supra note 14, at 29, 92, 105. Students and researchers are not only restricted from access-
ing certain publications, but they are also prohibited from engaging, unimpeded, in the 
sort of academic collaboration so vital to advancements in scholarship. See The Secretary-
General, 2009, supra note 14, at 105–06. 
70 The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 28. Additionally, academics from 
Cuba regularly face significant obstacles to participation in international conferences due 
to the travel restrictions imposed by the embargo. See id. at 105–06. When conferences are 
held in the United States, Cuban scientists, economists, engineers, and healthcare special-
ists are banned entirely, thus preventing them from updating their training and knowledge 
in their respective fields and learning from the experiences of other specialists. See id. at 
24–25, 90; The Secretary-General, 2007, supra note 14, at 29. 
71 See The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 34, 105; The Secretary-General, 
2007, supra note 14, at 29. 
72 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 57, at 13; The Secretary-General, 2009, 
supra note 14, at 28–29. 
73 See Senate Econ. Planning Office, supra note 57, at 17; Edward J. Blakely & Ted 
K. Bradshaw, Planning Local Economic Development: Theory and Practice 183 (3d 
ed. 2002) (discussing the necessity for infrastructural improvements in order to attract and 
facilitate industrial expansion). 
74 See The Secretary-General, 2007, supra note 14, at 98–99. 
75 See id. at 102. 
76 See Senate Econ. Planning Office, supra note 57, at 17. 
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The damage wrought on Cuba’s infrastructure by the U.S. blockade 
makes it exceedingly more difficult, and in some instances impossible, 
to create the infrastructure essential for normal rates and patterns of 
growth, let alone the normal functioning of a society.77 
 Certainly, the impact of the embargo on Cuba’s development im-
plicates a variety of areas beyond banking, communications and tech-
nology, human capital, and infrastructure.78 The United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development touched on the depth and breadth 
of the embargo’s effects—specifically with respect to Cuba’s develop-
ment—when the Secretary-General wrote, 
[I]t is evident that the United States embargo has resulted in 
a substantial opportunity cost for Cuba and has impeded 
Cuba’s efforts to integrate itself into the world trading system. 
This had an adverse impact on gross domestic product 
growth, export revenues, industrial and agricultural produc-
tion, trade and social sectors such as food, health, education, 
communications, science and technology in Cuba. Moreover, 
the impact of the extraterritorial aspect of the United States 
embargo has had important implications for trade diversion 
and the business environment, given the significant involve-
ment of United States interests in transnational corporations. 
Not only Cuban citizens but also those in third countries and 
in the United States are affected by the embargo in terms of 
the inability to interact with Cuba in the economic, academic 
and social fields.79 
Such an understanding of the contours of the right to development is 
more expansive, and perhaps more nuanced, than that to which the 
United States adheres.80 Nevertheless, if it is U.S. domestic law that is in 
conflict with the international legal right to development, it is neces-
sary to view the embargo in light of the United States’s limited concep-
                                                                                                                      
77 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 57, at 13–14; The Secretary-General, 2009, 
supra note 14, at 32–34, 112; The Secretary-General, 2007, supra note 14, at 98–99, 102. 
78 The Secretary-General, 2007, supra note 14, at 95. 
79 See id. 
80 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 57, at 13–14; see also Marks, supra note 20, 
at 141–42 (noting the staunch opposition of the United States to an understanding of 
development that would consider such factors as “inequities in international trade, the 
negative impacts of globalization, differential access to technology [and] the crushing debt 
burden”). 
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tion.81 The fact that the United States has recognized the importance 
of banking, communications and technology, human capital, and infra-
structure to the meaningful growth and development of a state—areas 
of the Cuban nation that are thoroughly eroded by the embargo— 
demonstrates the illegality of the blockade even under the most restric-
tive understandings of development.82 
IV. International Law and the U.S. Embargo 
 The obstinacy of the United States in maintaining the Cuban 
blockade in the face of mounting, and ultimately near absolute interna-
tional opposition, is one of the most egregious examples of such real-
politik in the history of the United Nations.83 Beginning in 1992, at the 
request of Cuba, the U.N. General Assembly began voting annually on 
a resolution calling for the end of the U.S. embargo on Cuba.84 The 
first vote, recorded in November 1992, was fifty-nine in favor, three op-
posed, with seventy-one abstentions.85 Over the course of the next sev-
enteen years, the vote shifted dramatically in favor of ending the em-
bargo as the abstaining countries lined up to condemn the United 
States’s policy toward Cuba.86 In 2009, 187 countries voted to end the 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). Conceptualizing the 
right to development more broadly will allow either Congress or the courts to avoid the 
constitutional question by construing the legislative enactments codifying the embargo 
narrowly, according to the Charming Betsy canon. See id. If the right to development is de-
fined narrowly, however, under a rubric already recognized by the U.S. government, it is 
impossible to avoid the constitutional impasse. See id. 
82 See U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 57, at 13–14. In outlining its “Framework 
for Economic Growth,” The U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) con-
ceives of telecommunications as a subset of infrastructure, which comprises one-third of 
the growth “enabler” equation (the other two enablers being finance and human re-
sources). See id. According to USAID, the development enablers “cannot by themselves cause 
economic growth,” although it is clear that weak or missing enablers will have an adverse 
impact on development. See id. 
83 See U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 22; see also U.N. GAOR, 
63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 20–21 (noting that, year after year, the argu-
ments proffered by the United States in defense of its Cuban embargo are rejected by 
more states, but the United States is nevertheless able to flout the express will of the inter-
national community because of its economic strength). 
84 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations to the 
Secretary-General, supra note 45. 
85 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 70th plen. mtg. at 88, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.70 (Dec. 9, 1992). 
86 See U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 48th plen. mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/48/PV.48 (Nov. 3, 
1993) (recording the 1993 vote as 88 in favor of ending the embargo, 4 against, with 57 ab-
stentions); U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 45th plen. mtg. at 13–14, U.N. Doc. A/49/PV.45 (Oct. 26, 
1994) (recording the 1994 vote as 101–2–48); U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 48th plen. mtg. at 17–
18, U.N. Doc. A/50/PV.48 (Nov. 2, 1995) (recording the 1995 vote as 117–3–38); U.N. 
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embargo, with two countries abstaining.87 The only two countries in the 
world to vote with the United States were Israel and Palau, and Israel 
openly violates the embargo contrary to its vote.88 
 Yet the United States’s response to the consistent and vociferous 
indictments from the international community that its embargo of 
Cuba is in direct violation of international law, which has ranged from 
decidedly impassive to manifestly inflammatory, belies the relationship 
between U.S. and international law.89 Not only is international law used 
as an interpretive mechanism for U.S. domestic law, but international 
law is and always has been a constituent part of U.S. law.90 
                                                                                                                      
GAOR, 51st Sess., 57th plen. mtg. at 21–22, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.57 (Nov. 12, 1996) (re-
cording the 1996 vote as 137–3–25); U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 45th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/52/PV.45 (Nov. 5, 1997) (recording the 1997 vote as 143–3–17); U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 
37th plen. mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.37 (Oct. 14, 1998) (recording the 1998 vote as 
157–2–12); U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 50th plen. mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.50 (Nov. 9, 
1999) (recording the 1999 vote as 155–2–8); U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 56th plen. mtg. at 23–
24, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.56 (Nov. 9, 2000) (recording the 2000 vote as 167–3–4); U.N. GAOR, 
56th Sess., 64th plen. mtg. at 19–20, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.64 (Nov. 27, 2001) (recording the 
2001 vote as 167–3–3); U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 48th plen. mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. A/57/PV.48 
(Nov. 12, 2002) (recording the 2002 vote as 173–3–4); U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 54th plen. 
mtg. at 18–19, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.54 (Nov. 4, 2003) (recording the 2003 vote as 179–3–2); 
U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 44th plen. mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.44 (Oct. 28, 2004) (re-
cording the 2004 vote as 179–4–1); U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 45th plen. mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/60/PV.45 (Nov. 8, 2005) (recording the 2005 vote as 182–4–1); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 
50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 22 (recording the 2006 vote as 183–4–1); U.N. GAOR, 62nd 
Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 18–19 (recording the 2007 vote as 184–4–1); U.N. 
GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 22 (recording the 2008 vote as 185–3–2); 
U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 22 (recording the 2009 vote as 187–
3–2). 
87 U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 22. 
88 See Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs 83 
(2000). 
89 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. GAOR, 
63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 14–15; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. 
mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. In what 
has become an annual ritual, the United States will generally defend its blockade of Cuba 
first by halfheartedly declaring that it is a bilateral issue that should not be brought before 
the General Assembly, then provocatively attacking the Cuban government and blaming 
the humanitarian results of the embargo on its intransigence, and finally defending the 
virtues of its own conduct in the face of such obstinacy. See U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th 
plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 
14–15; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 
50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. 
90 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 
776–77 (1950). The Supreme Court of the United States has invoked international law to 
interpret U.S. law in a number of cases, including Johnson v. Eisentrager and, more recently, 
Rasul v. Bush. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484–85; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776–77. The Supreme 
Court has also stated unequivocally that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often 
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A. International Law Is U.S. Law 
 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, international law codified in 
treaties is elevated to a status, together with federal statues and the Con-
stitution itself, of “the supreme Law of the Land.”91 Moreover, nothing 
in this constitutional mandate requires that customary international 
law be subordinated to treaties.92 If both treaties and customary inter-
national law constitute binding international obligations of the United 
States, it is sound, both logically and constitutionally, to treat them as 
coordinate forms of law.93 Thus, both treaties and customary interna-
tional law are subject to the same principles when a conflict exists be-
tween the United States’s international commitments and domestic 
legislation.94 
 If the Constitution does not preclude the elevation of customary 
international law to the level of treaties or domestic enactments in the-
ory, then practice has borne this out—the U.S. legal system has long 
accorded great respect, and deference, to the “law of nations.”95 As the 
Supreme Court noted in 1796, “[w]hen the United States declared 
their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in 
its modern state of purity and refinement.”96 The Founders expected 
                                                                                                                      
as questions of right depending on it are duly presented for their determination.” The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law 
in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1561–62 (1984) (discussing the historical con-
vergence of international law and U.S. law and the manner in which the relationship be-
tween the two co-equal forms has evolved). 
91 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby . . . .”). 
92 See Henkin, supra note 7, at 877. 
93 See id. at 877–78. 
94 See id. at 878 (“If an act of Congress can modify customary law for domestic pur-
poses, it is . . . because, like treaties, customary law is equal in status to legislation, and the 
more recent of the two governs.”). 
95 See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Note, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Hu-
man Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 463, 464 (1997) (“As new mem-
bers in the community of nations, the Founders felt bound, both ethically and pragmati-
cally, to inherit and abide by the law of nations.”). 
96 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796); see also Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 133, 161 (1795) (stating “this is so palpable a violation of our own law . . . of which 
the law of nations is a part, as it subsisted either before the act of Congress on the subject, 
or since”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (holding “the United 
States had . . . become amenable to the laws of nations; and it was their interest as well as 
their duty to provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed”); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 
26, 27 (1792) (concluding “the law of nations, although not specifically adopted . . . is 
essentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation commences and runs with the exis-
tence of a nation”). 
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that the customary law of nations would find application in U.S. courts 
by virtue of the nation’s membership in the international community; 
moreover, they unquestionably intended this outcome.97 Early juris-
prudence reflected this intent.98 In the time since the nation’s found-
ing, the incorporation of international law into both federal and state 
law has continued unabated, with scholars, commentators, and jurists 
reiterating the propriety of such developments.99 Cases arising under 
international law or international agreements to which the United 
States has acquiesced are within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.100 These 
courts “are bound to give effect to international law.”101 Similarly, 
“[c]ases arising under treaties to which the United States is a party, as 
well as cases arising under customary international law” are “within the 
Judicial Power of the United States under Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution.”102 
B. The U.S. Embargo Contravenes International Law 
 The overwhelming weight of research and scholarly discourse on 
the subject of the U.S. embargo of Cuba has exposed a very damning 
pattern of behavior on the part of the United States.103 By the standards 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of 
the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 301, 301 (1999) (“The Founders clearly expected that 
the customary law of nations was binding, was supreme law, created (among others) pri-
vate rights and duties, and would be applicable in United States federal courts.”). 
98 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (“International law is part of our law, 
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion . . . .”). 
99 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (declaring that 
“courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and 
exists among the nations of the world today,” and then applying those principles to pro-
vide federal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate rights “already recognized by interna-
tional law”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 111(1) 
(1987) (noting that “[i]nternational law and international agreements are law of the United 
States and supreme over the law of the several States”); see also Goodman & Jinks, supra 
note 95, at 466 (identifying a wide range of adherents to the notion that customary inter-
national law has legal effect in the United States, including a number of federal courts, the 
executive, the American Law Institute, and the American Bar Association). But see Medel-
lin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23 (2008) (refusing to create, based on the international 
obligations of the United States to comply with judgments of the International Court of 
Justice, automatically-binding domestic law in the absence of enabling legislation). 
100 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 111(1) 
(1987). Moreover, the Presidednt has the obligation and authority to make sure that inter-
national law is faithfully executed within the boundaries of this nation. See id. § 111 cmt. c. 
101 See id. § 111(2), (3). 
102 Id. § 111 cmt. e. 
103 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 13–19. 
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of nearly every government in the world except the United States, the 
comprehensive embargo on Cuba incontrovertibly violates interna-
tional human rights law and international humanitarian law due to its 
devastating humanitarian impact.104 In reality, the views of the world 
community and those of the United States may not be as far apart as 
commentators might suggest. The government does continue to argue 
publicly that its conduct is wholly consistent with international law.105 
Recent modifications to the embargo undertaken for “humanitarian 
reasons,” however, undercut this position.106 At least with respect to the 
embargo’s humanitarian consequences, there is evidence the United 
States appreciates that its embargo may violate certain international 
legal norms.107 
                                                                                                                      
104 See generally U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3 (documenting the 
statements of governments on the subject of the Cuban embargo). The comments of the 
South African delegate, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China on the subject of 
the embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, are paradigmatic of the views 
generally held and expressed by the international community to describe the embargo in 
recent years: 
[The] long-standing economic, commercial and financial embargo [of Cuba] 
has been consistently rejected by a growing number of Member States to the 
point at which the opposition has become almost unanimous. Thus, the need 
to respect international law in the conduct of international relations has been 
recognized by most members of this body, as has been evidenced by the grow-
ing support for the draft resolution [condemning the embargo] . . . . I believe 
that the presence of such a large number of Member States in this Hall today 
and their participation in these deliberations are indications of their opposi-
tion to unilateral extraterritorial measures. They express their firm opposi-
tion to unilateral measures as a means of exerting pressure on developing 
countries, as such measures are contrary to international law, international 
humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter and the norms and principles 
governing peaceful relations among States. 
Id. at 2. 
105 See id. at 6. 
106 See supra notes 3, 4 and accompanying text. 
107 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. When defending 
its conduct as consistent with international law, the U.S. government generally attempts to 
avoid blame for the humanitarian crisis in Cuba through two key arguments supporting its 
legality. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6022 (2006); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra 
note 3, at 6. First, the United States blames the Cuban government for its failure to respect 
the political freedoms, associational rights, and economic liberties of its people. See, e.g., 22 
U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6022; U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. 
GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 14–15; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th 
plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. 
Second, at least in recent years, the government points to the “humanitarian” efforts it has 
undertaken in connection with the embargo. See U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., 
supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 14–15; 
U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th 
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 Yet, the international community’s efforts to impel the United 
States to lift its embargo for humanitarian reasons, and the United 
States’s efforts to minimize the humanitarian impact of the embargo, 
have only addressed violations of a discrete set of international legal 
norms.108 Even if the United States were somehow able to mitigate, or 
eliminate entirely, the ruinous consequences the embargo has on the 
Cuban people, such a comprehensive embargo would nevertheless be 
illegal under international law.109 In other words, the illegality of such 
measures under international law is not simply predicated on its effect 
on the Cuban people on a micro-level—it also is established by refer-
ence to the nation-state itself and the macro-level concept of develop-
ment.110 
 Because the embargo of the Cuban nation completely inhibits the 
country’s ability to pass from a third-world service and agricultural 
economy to more advanced stages of development, it violates interna-
tional law to which the United States is bound by both treaty and cus-
tom.111 First and foremost among such violations has been the abroga-
                                                                                                                      
plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. In other words, the United States argues that its embargo 
would be illegal only if the humanitarian devastation were caused by the United States and 
not Cuba, and even if the United States is the cause of the ill effects, the measures it has 
taken to mitigate those effects absolve it of responsibility under international law. See U.N. 
GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd 
plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 14–15; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 
18; U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. The mere fact the United 
States engages in this debate, however, is evidence that it is at least cognizant of the poten-
tial violations of international legal norms implicated by its conduct. See U.N. GAOR, 64th 
Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., su-
pra note 3, at 14–15; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. 
108 See generally U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3; U.N. GAOR, 63rd 
Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., supra note 3; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3; 
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3. Countries regularly condemn the 
United States for a number of separate violations of international law; yet, when the 
United States defends its embargo as consistent with international legal principles, it ne-
glects to address the claimed violation of Cuba’s right to development. See U.N. GAOR, 
64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 19–20; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., 
supra note 3, at 14–15; U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 38th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 18; U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 6. 
109 See Marks, supra note 20, at 138. 
110 See id.; see also U.N. Charter arts. 55–56 (pledging co-operation among U.N. mem-
ber states to promote “conditions of economic and social” advantage). 
111 See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6, 
art. 28; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 1; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, art. 1; The Secre-
tary-General, 2009, supra note 14, at 28, 31, 32–34, 97, 112; The Secretary-General, 2007, 
supra note 14, at 27, 29, 38–39, 75, 78, 92, 98–99, 102; discussion supra Part II. A treaty is 
binding on the United States, that is, the United States must comply with the obligations 
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tion of its duties under the Charter of the United Nations.112 Having 
signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights as well as signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the United States has further breached its interna-
tional obligations codified in treaties.113 While the United States has 
resisted the codification of the right to development in more specific 
instruments and the evolution of the right into a legitimate norm of 
international law, its often sole opposition to the right has not pre-
vented it from becoming customary international law binding on the 
United States.114 
V. Constitutionalizing the Embargo: Executive, Legislative, 
and Judicial Responsibilities 
 Although international law is a constituent element of U.S. law, the 
attitudes of the bodies charged with preserving that close relationship 
have, at various times throughout the nation’s history, run the gamut 
between deferential and derisive, complimentary and contentious.115 
On the one hand, the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative 
                                                                                                                      
set forth in the instrument, when “the United States has consented to be bound by that 
agreement,” and the agreement has “entered into force.” See Avero Belg. Ins. v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1995). Although signing a treaty was once sufficient as a 
manifestation of consent to be bound, modern U.S. practice has deviated from this cus-
tom. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 307, 313 (2007). The United States must also “ratify” a treaty, which gen-
erally refers to the process by which the Senate “consent[s] to a treaty that has been sent to 
the Senate by the President for legislative consideration” before the President officially 
ratifies the instrument. Avero Belg. Ins., 423 F.3d at 78. While the process by which norms of 
customary international law become binding on a state is less well-defined, the right to 
development has certainly risen to the level of customary international law and become 
binding on the United States. See discussion supra Part II. 
112 See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56. After President Harry S. Truman signed the U.N. 
Charter on June 26, 1945, he submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent. 91 
Cong. Rec. 7118–19 (1945). The Senate consented to ratification of the Charter by a vote 
of 89 to 2, and President Truman then officially ratified the Charter on August 8, 1945. S.J. 
Res. 144, 80th Cong., 61 Stat. 756 (1947) (enacted); 91 Cong. Rec. 8189–8190 (1945). 
113 See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
114 See discussion supra Part II. 
115 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23 (2008); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 
677, 700 (1900); see also James B. Staab, The Political Thought of Justice Antonin 
Scalia: A Hamiltonian on the Supreme Court 214–15 (2006) (describing a heated 
debate between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer on the role of interna-
tional law in U.S. constitutional interpretation); Jesse S. Reeves, The Jones Act and the De-
nunciation of Treaties, 15 Am. J. Int’l L. 33, 35 (noting that Congress has, at times during 
the nation’s history, “legislated in the face of international obligations”). 
2010] Economic Sanctions, Right to Development, & Violations of International Law 445 
branches are required to give force to international law.116 On the other 
hand, both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. govern-
ment may act in violation of a treaty or customary international law.117 
The Supreme Court has also recognized a distinction between treaties 
that “automatically have effect as domestic law” and are “equivalent to 
an act of the legislature,” and those that “do not by themselves function 
as binding federal law” and require an additional congressional enact-
ment to give them force.118 
 As a matter of domestic law, it is clear the United States may dis-
avow or ignore its obligations under international law.119 This principle 
does not extend to the international arena—failure to give domestic 
effect to international legal commitments does not absolve the United 
States of those obligations on the international level.120 With respect to 
both treaty obligations and international legal norms that have risen to 
the level of customary international law, then, the United States is 
bound to follow international law or risk defaulting on its obligations as 
a member of the international community.121 In the absence of mean-
ingful enforcement mechanisms, this does not seem particularly prob-
                                                                                                                      
116 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.; Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Con-
stitution 198–202 (2d ed. 1996) (describing congressional declarations carving out ex-
ceptions or expressing reservations to international instruments as “‘anti-Constitutional’ in 
spirit and highly problematic as a matter of law”). 
117 Glennon, supra note 8, at 325. 
118 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504–05. 
119 See Glennon, supra note 8, at 325; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) 
(stating that if “Congress has made its intent in the statute clear, [a court] must give effect 
to that intent”) (internal quotations omitted). 
120 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504–05, 522–23. Although the Supreme Court held in 
Medellin v. Texas that a non-self-executing treaty does not create enforceable rights in U.S. 
courts, implicit in the decision was the notion that the absence of automatic domestic legal 
effect does not render an international obligation any less binding vis-à-vis the world 
community. See id; see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180 n.21 (1995) (positing 
that, while individual nations may be left to fashion specific domestic legal remedies for a 
cause of action, countries still have a duty to redress international law violations). Signed 
and ratified treaties “comprise international commitments” even if the treaty itself does 
not give rise to domestically-enforceable federal law. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505. More-
over, a state party to a non-self-executing treaty must “implement it promptly, and failure 
to do so would render [the state] in default under its treaty obligations.” Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 111, rep. n.5 (1987). Whether the 
rights or obligations under the treaty can be sued upon in domestic courts is, therefore, an 
issue distinguishable from whether the state party to the treaty is fulfilling its obligations 
under international law. See id. § 115(1)(b). 
121 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 115(1)(b) 
(1987) (“That a rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is 
superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obliga-
tion or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.”). 
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lematic.122 So much more is at stake, though—if the United States 
wishes to use international legal mechanisms to pursue its interests, it 
must demonstrate to the world that it takes international law seriously 
within the constitutional framework.123 Especially in the context of the 
Cuban embargo, where U.S. federal law is in direct conflict with inter-
national law, the United States must accord adequate respect for the 
latter and take steps to resolve the tension.124 In order to accomplish 
this, each branch of government— executive, legislative, and judicial— 
has a role to play.125 
 The judiciary possesses the constitutional authority to overturn the 
Cuban embargo as unconstitutional by virtue of its departure from the 
law of nations.126 The embargo presents a very clear question of statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation, specifically, whether the trade 
blockade imposed on Cuba and codified in U.S. law directly conflicts 
with the right to development as it is described in international instru-
ments to which the United States is a party, or as it is framed as a norm 
of customary international law to which the United States is bound.127 
 Nevertheless, courts regularly refuse to reach the merits of claims 
relating to the blockade of Cuba at all, asserting that they present non-
                                                                                                                      
122 See Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
797, 798 (2005) (describing the “realist” approach to international law as subscribing to 
the view that “states follow their interests come what may”). 
123 See id. at 799–800. 
124 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
125 See infra notes 126, 134, 139 and accompanying text. 
126 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). If international law is U.S. law 
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and it is the “duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is,” then it is clearly within the Court’s authority to rule on questions of inter-
national law. See id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See also Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 111(2), (3) (1987) (noting that cases 
arising under international law or international agreements to which the United States has 
acquiesced are within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts). 
127 See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1986). When 
faced with a legal question of statutory interpretation touching on international law, the 
Supreme Court has held: 
[I]t is “error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” 
 . . . 
 [T]he courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agree-
ments, and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is 
a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts. . . . [U]nder the Consti-
tution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and 
we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have sig-
nificant political overtones. 
Id. at 229–30 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1969)). 
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justiciable political questions.128 Where courts have addressed the con-
stitutional questions posed by the international legal implications of the 
embargo, they have either 1) ruled purely on domestic legal grounds, or 
2) found no direct conflict with international law.129 To date, no court 
has ruled on whether Cuba’s right to development, protected under 
customary international law, would render any aspect of the Cuban em-
bargo postdating the development of this norm unconstitutional.130 If 
the judiciary is ever asked to rule on the conflict between Cuba’s right 
to development and most, if not all, the provisions of the embargo, it 
should not shy away from its constitutional duty to invalidate the provi-
sions in question.131 In light of the powerful currents of judicial restraint 
that have guided courts’ rulings on the subject to date, however, a 
sweeping judicial invalidation of a half-century of foreign policy is 
unlikely.132 Consequently, the task of bringing U.S. foreign policy toward 
Cuba in accord with international legal norms is, in all practicality, left 
to the political branches.133 
 The executive possesses significant authority to alter the nature of 
the embargo such that it does not completely undermine Cuba’s right 
                                                                                                                      
128 See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (declining to hear the claim that 
Cuban embargo no longer implicated the national security concerns sufficient to justify its 
continued existence); Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1966) (de-
clining to consider claim that nature of Cuba’s foreign policy did not justify regulations 
freezing Cuban assets). 
129 See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (“[A]n Act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”). The ap-
proach followed by the court in Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb is paradigmatic of 
the judiciary’s general reluctance to strike down federal law as incompatible with interna-
tional law. See 82 F.3d 1431, 1438–41 (9th Cir. 1996). In ruling on the constitutionality of 
the Cuban Asset Control Regulations, the court focused mainly on domestic constitutional 
implications, holding that the Regulations are neither an unconstitutional delegation of 
congressional authority nor unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth and First Amend-
ments. See id. at 1438, 1440. To the extent the court was forced to address the embargo’s 
constitutionality in light of international law, the court summarily rejected the argument 
that any conflict between the two existed. See id. at 1441–42. 
130 See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118, 119; Marks, supra note 20, at 142, 167. Indeed the 
United States has not formally recognized that the right development has matured into a 
legitimate norm of customary international law; thus no court would have occasion to rule 
on the relationship of the Cuban embargo to that norm. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118, 
119; Marks, supra note 20, at 142, 167. 
131 See Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 229–30. Until Congress passes new legislation 
which explicitly and unequivocally demonstrates an intent to disregard the right to devel-
opment, the provisions of the embargo on Cuba bearing on its development remain un-
constitutional. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118. 
132 See Regan, 468 U.S. at 242; Sardino, 361 F.2d at 112. 
133 See Regan, 468 U.S. at 242; Sardino, 361 F.2d at 112. 
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to development.134 President Obama has already taken some positive 
steps toward compliance with international law, easing some of the re-
strictions on remittances and travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans 
with relatives in Cuba.135 The steps taken exhibit the same fundamental 
deficiency of past actions with respect to easing the embargo, however, 
in that they focus almost exclusively on the humanitarian impact and 
largely ignore the development issue.136 With respect to Cuba’s capacity 
for development, the most debilitating components of the Federal 
Regulations promulgated by the executive remain in force.137 By renew-
ing his TWEA powers in September 2009, President Obama has en-
sured Cuba’s vulnerability for at least another year.138 
 Congress’s capacity to bring the embargo on Cuba back onto 
sound constitutional footing, by ensuring its conformity with interna-
tional law, far exceeds that of the other branches.139 While the regula-
tions promulgated by the executive certainly play a significant role in 
stifling economic development in Cuba, the president’s authority to 
carry out the embargo is derived entirely from legislative enact-
ments.140 Likewise, the judiciary is limited in its ability to alter funda-
mentally the nature of U.S. policy toward Cuba both by its own pruden-
tial concerns about non-justiciable political questions and the 
constitutional constraints on jurisdiction.141 For both constitutional and 
practical reasons, then, the prospective constitutionality of the embargo 
rests in the hands of Congress.142 
                                                                                                                      
134 See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (2006); 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2006). Pursuant to the 
President’s expansive powers with respect to the Cuban embargo, he may repeal or otherwise 
alter the Federal Regulations if certain conditions are met. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2009). Thus, 
it is within the executive’s power to eliminate those aspects of the embargo that currently 
have a direct and substantial negative impact on Cuba’s development. See id; Amnesty Int’l, 
supra note 4. 
135 See Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Embargo on Cuba Again Finds Scant Support at U.N., N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 29, 2009, at A8. 
136 See 22 U.S.C. § 7202 (facilitating Cuba’s importation of agricultural products and 
medical supplies but failing to accommodate Cuba’s need for materials necessary for the 
development of infrastructure and industry). 
137 See 31 C.F.R. pt. 515. 
138 See MacFarquhar, supra note 135. 
139 See Brest, supra note 9, at 61–65 (discussing Congress’s capacity to engage in consti-
tutionalism and the need for such engagement where, for example, judicial review has 
been foreclosed). 
140 See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1); 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2006). 
141 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. If an argument that the embargo on Cuba un-
dermines its right to development does not reach an Article III court in the context of a 
case or controversy, the judiciary will never have an opportunity to pass on the constitu-
tionality of the embargo. See id. 
142 See Brest, supra note 9, at 63–65. 
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 Especially in situations where, as here, congress is the only branch 
of government practically capable of upholding the Constitution, it 
cannot shirk this solemn responsibility.143 If the ultimate goal is to “con-
stitutionalize” what is otherwise a constitutionally impermissible breach 
of international law, Congress has two options, both of which require a 
genuine appreciation for the role of international law in the constitu-
tional framework.144 
 Congress’s first option involves duly recognizing the right to devel-
opment as a legitimate norm of international law, conceding that the 
right conflicts directly with federal law, and resolving the conflict by 
passing new legislation unequivocally rejecting the norm under the 
Charming Betsy canon.145 Where, as here, the development of an interna-
tional legal norm postdates a federal legislative enactment, that rule re-
quires a clear statement from Congress that it specifically intends to con-
travene an international legal norm.146 Under this approach, Congress 
could simply pass new legislation as or even more harmful to Cuban de-
velopment as long as it explicitly recognizes the right to development as 
an international legal norm and provides a clear legislative mandate to 
repeal that norm.147 Certainly, a newly-codified embargo would still vio-
late international law, but the constitutional tension between these co-
equal forms of law would be resolved, by reference to the timing and 
language of the enactment, in favor of the new legislation.148 
 Contrastingly, Congress may, out of respect for the views of every 
single nation in the world (except Israel and Palau) and concomitant 
appreciation of the role the Founders wished international law to play 
in our legal system, repeal the legislation creating the embargo.149 The 
                                                                                                                      
143 See id. at 63. 
144 See Henkin, supra note 7, at 877–78. 
145 See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118, 119; see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 
194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, “the one last in date will 
control the other”); Henkin, supra note 7, at 877–78 (explaining that customary interna-
tional law and treaties are both on equal footing with legislative enactments and thus sub-
ject to the “last in time” rule). 
146 See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 119. 
147 See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (stating where congressional intent is clear, courts 
will resolve constitutional tensions in favor of that intent); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
315–16 (2001) (holding Congress may enact ex post facto law as long as it provides a clear 
statement). 
148 See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 119; Henkin, supra note 7, at 
877–78. 
149 See The Federalist No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that all members of the 
world community, of which the United States was a part upon independence, are recipro-
cally “answerable to foreign powers”); see also Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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economic blockade of Cuba represents one of the most egregious viola-
tions of international law in modern statecraft.150 The United States 
cannot violate international law with impunity and then attempt to 
avail itself of international legal mechanisms for redress of perceived 
wrongs to itself or its citizens; neither can it compel compliance with 
international law by other states.151 Although it is critical, as a matter of 
domestic law, to constitutionalize the embargo, simply recodifying it 
and explicitly stating an intention to violate Cuba’s right to develop-
ment can only further damage the United States’s standing in the com-
munity of nations.152 Thus, if the United States is to accord the appro-
priate respect for international law and thereby maintain its position of 
global leadership, especially on issues of fundamental rights and liber-
ties, Congress must end the embargo on Cuba.153 
Conclusion 
 When the Obama administration took office, it entered the debate 
on Cuba and the nearly half-century old embargo that has crippled the 
tiny island nation with a self-avowed respect for the law of nations. De-
spite easing some restrictions on the ability of Cuban-Americans with 
family in Cuba to travel and send remittances, the President’s promises 
on Cuba have gone largely unfulfilled. The Cuban embargo, in its cur-
rent form, remains a constitutionally impermissible violation of inter-
national law, specifically, the international legal norm prohibiting inter-
ference with a nation’s right to develop. 
                                                                                                                      
150 See generally The Secretary-General, 2009, supra note 14 (documenting the ire of the 
international community with respect to the Cuban embargo). No other modern act of 
state has provoked such widespread, unanimous condemnation by the international com-
munity. See Chomsky, supra note 88, at 83 (noting that the United States is “100 percent 
isolated” in its stance toward Cuba, and further that Israel—the only country that purport-
edly supports the U.S. position—regularly violates the embargo). 
151 See Joseph Kahn, In Response, China Attacks U.S. Record on Rights, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 
2006, at A12. Other countries have taken notice of U.S. violations. See id. For example, in 
response to the State Department’s annual report on human rights conditions globally, the 
Chinese government responded, “As in previous years, the State Department pointed the 
finger at human rights situations in more than 190 countries and regions, including 
China, but kept silent on the serious violations of human rights in the United States.” Id. 
Cuba has similarly questioned whether the United States has any legitimate claim to 
“moral authority” with respect to enforcing human rights norms when it regularly disre-
gards such norms. See  U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 50th plen. mtg., supra note 3, at 11. 
152 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504–05, 522–23; Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Charming Betsy, 6 
U.S. at 119; Henkin, supra note 7, at 877–78; supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
153 See Posner, supra note 122, at 842. 
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 Although both the executive and the judiciary can play a role in 
constitutionalizing the blockade, it is the U.S. Congress that possesses 
the greatest power to square federal enactments with international law. 
The legislature can accomplish this either by passing new legislation 
stating the United States’s intentions to flout international legal norms, 
or repealing altogether the legislative enactments giving force to the 
embargo. If the United States values its reputation as an advocate of 
human rights and the rule of law in the international sphere, the 
choice between these two options is obvious. 
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